Παρέμβαση ΣΕΒ στην Επιτροπή Εφαρμογής Διεθνών Κανόνων Εργασίας της Διεθνούς Οργάνωσης Εργασίας (ILΟ) κατά τη διάρκεια της 107ης Διεθνούς Συνδιάσκεψη Εργασίας 2018 στη Γενεύη

From the part of Greek employers and more specifically of the Hellenic Federation of Enterprises, SEV, I would also like to focus primarily on the Committee’s remarks on p.92 of the report, regarding C98 and specifically on Article 4, “Promotion of collective bar-gaining”. Two important issues are presented there; one has to do with Enterprise-level collective agreements and Association of Persons, and the second has to do with Com-pulsory Arbitration.

About Enterprise-level collective agreements and Association of Persons

As far as the competence of association of persons to represent workers at firm level where a trade union does not exist, we believe this is a measure in full accordance with ILO standards, which actively promotes collective bargaining and social dialogue at the level of the firm. Existing law in Greece allows this and should not be changed. We dis-agree with the suggestion in the report of providing special regulations for allowing trade union sections in small companies. In the specific context of our country, this can only be seen as Government intervention in the way the workers want to organize of their own free will. Therefore, from the side of the Greek Employers, I emphasize that there should be no change presently in the law allowing association of persons to repre-sent workers at firm level where a trade union does not exist.

For avoidance of doubt, this position is independent of whether a favourability principle exists or not in our country’s laws.

Now let us turn to the issue of Compulsory Arbitration in Greece.

Our system, to the extent it includes unilateral recourse to compulsory arbitration, was found by ILO bodies to be against ILO standards on several occasions, as was men-tioned by my colleague. It is also against the European Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, as was pointed out by ETUC who were negatively surprised that compulsory arbitration was re-instated in 2014.

But why do we believe this to be a problem?

Recourse to compulsory arbitration stifles the development of collective negotiations. In practice it caused absence of industrial action and absence of development of collective bargaining. From an employer’s viewpoint, practically eliminating industrial action may appear as positive; it is true that there were almost zero strikes in the private sector on salary issues for more than twenty-five years. But we should not be naïve. Near-zero strikes on salary issues is really a symptom that the system has consistently provided easy solutions accommodating the workers’ side. It constitutes an enormous and funda-mental distortion of the collective bargaining environment.

The distorted playing field for collective bargaining is one of the main reasons that social dialogue between workers and employers has been almost non-existent during the 10 years of financial and social crisis in Greece. The absence of social dialogue as a tool for problem-solving in front of major social and economic challenges, is an even more im-portant consequence, with considerable negative repercussions in society, well beyond the coverage of our respective organizations.

What do we propose to the Government?

The supporters of compulsory arbitration hide behind a Council of State 2014 decision. Following that decision, the government at the time introduced Law 4303/2014 that rein-stated compulsory arbitration, which is essentially the same as the previous laws that were found by ILO bodies to infringe C98. The present Government intends to keep things that way.

However, we maintain that even within the framework of that decision of the Council of State, we can still drastically improve the situation by adjusting the scope of compulsory arbitration to be as close as possible to ILO standards.

Our proposal is for compulsory arbitration to be accepted as the ultimate measure for resolving collective disputes strictly in the following cases:

1. Where the employer is an entity belonging to General Government, or where the employer provides essential services ( ).
2. [Compulsory arbitration could be accepted in] Sectors of the economy where the resolution of a collective dispute is necessary for reasons of public interest that is at risk at the moment of the dispute. In this sense, apart from General Government and essential services, a collective dispute at firm or occupational level cannot ever be conceived as putting at risk the public interest, and thus compulsory arbi-tration should not be allowed for firm-level or occupational-level disputes. For sectoral, regional or national-level disputes, risk of public interest should be proven, if it is to merit recourse to compulsory arbitration.
3. [Compulsory arbitration could be accepted] If one of the party refuses in bad faith to enter in negotiations.
4. [Compulsory arbitration could be accepted] If negotiations have definitively failed. This must be proven by the following conditions existing cumulatively:

• At least a year has passed since the expiration of the previous collective agreement,
• The minutes of negotiations show that one side refuses to accept the realis-tic proposals of the other side,
• All means of union pressure have been used. To be more explicit, unilat-eral recourse to compulsory arbitration is not acceptable if, beforehand, strike action has not been undertaken to exert pressure on the employer.

SEV is aware that, even with these proposals, Greece would not achieve full compliance with ILO standards. However significant improvement could be made as an interim measure, until an opportunity arises to settle the matter at the level of the Constitution, or its interpretation.

In addition to the drastic restriction of scope where compulsory arbitration is allowed, there should be instituted substantial improvements in the existing framework of the ar-bitration body, OMED. Safeguards and other measures should be taken regarding the weaknesses mentioned by my colleague earlier. These are, briefly:

• Procedures to establish true representativeness for both sides of the dispute.
• Strong safeguards for ensuring independence of arbitrators and mediators.
• Professionally qualified arbitrators and mediators.
• Standards for having decisions that are adequately substantiated concerning their economic impact.
• Provide for full-scale self-government of OMED by the social partners regarding its administrative or legal setup and also its funding, and regarding the internal processes of arbitration and mediation.

Have we taken all the measures we can at national level?

First, at the level of justice. Following the 2014 decision by the Council of State, it is diffi-cult for SEV to find another opportunity to rectify the situation through the judicial route.

Second, measures taken at the level of social dialogue. All employers’ organizations have made explicit statements from time to time (and again in May this year) against compulsory arbitration. In December 2017, SEV extended to the workers’ union, GSEE, a formal invitation to discuss a brand-new arbitration system (among other matters). GSEE retorted with a declaration that effectively wants return to the initial system that existed before the crisis. It proposed the abolition of the reforms of Law 4303/2014, the law that brought back compulsory arbitration after the Council of State decision, and which had some marginal improvements over the old system, while maintaining all the major drawbacks. So, discussion with the workers stopped before even starting.

Third, measures taken at the level of Government. It is with great disillusionment that we note the Government’s total lack of willingness to make the slightest move in the di-rection indicated above. During the past three weeks, the Minister of Labour received the opinions of all social partners on a few issues, among which the matter of compulso-ry arbitration. Her commitments on how to regulate these issues were included in the technical document drafted jointly with the country’s creditors, the so called “staff level agreement”. In that document there is no reference to any change along the lines men-tioned above. Therefore, we have in black and white the explicit binding commitment of the Greek Government to continue flouting C98 and C154 for the foreseeable future.

To conclude

Legally, Greek compulsory arbitration regulations have been repeatedly found to be against ILO standards.

In terms of practice, this arbitration system, is not ancillary and is not peripheral in the Greek collective bargaining environment. It is dominant and central in Greek industrial relations and grossly distorts collective bargaining.

But if we have a dysfunctional collective bargaining system, how can we ever hope to develop a healthy social dialogue? Trust is undermined between the social partners and a no-risk mentality by the workers’ side leads them away from the table of discussions on all sorts of social and economic challenges. This is exactly what happened during the crisis, which meant that social dialogue was practically dead when it was most needed, when a quarter of GDP evaporated, when a quarter of everybody’s income was lost, and when a quarter of the working population was and still is out of a job.

If the government is sincere about “reviving collective bargaining”, as it says, it should start by taking steps to comply with C98.

If the workers truly believe in free collective bargaining as the main pillar for effective social dialogue, they should find the courage to denounce compulsory arbitration. They can do it here and now, in this room, and commit not to use it in practice any more.